White House seeks credit for cracking secret weapons ring
Artykuł pochodzi z pisma "Guardian"
Bush boasts about uncovering arms network but observers wonder why it took so long
Ian Traynor
Friday February 13, 2004
The Guardian
The International Atomic Energy Agency responded to White House attempts to curb the black market in nuclear technology yesterday by arguing, in effect, that George Bush's proposals did not go far enough.
Its director, Mohammed ELBaradei, said: "I have the same concern and sense of urgency to shore up [international security]." He called for nuclear racketeers to be treated as criminals, a prospect not on the cards for the confessed and pardoned godfather of the rackets, Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan.
But, unlike Mr Bush, he also argued that control of nuclear technology exports should not be left in the hands of the west-dominated Nuclear Suppliers Group: binding regulation should be introduced through a new international treaty.
In an article in the New York Times he omitted to mention Mr Bush's call for a new IAEA committee on nuclear security.
IAEA sources say the proposal is highly problematic and would not gain international agreement, and they criticise Washington for its lack of "bridgebuilding" diplomacy. "ElBaradei is not exactly the most popular guy in Washington," one said.
One of the most contentious issues between Washington and the IAEA is intelligence, and the increasingly public attempt by the US to take all the credit for unmasking the Khan network.
The network, which IAEA investigators and western intelligence services are seeking to trace, extends from Malaysia to South Africa, northern Europe and the Middle East. The key beneficiaries of the black market are or have been North Korea, Iran and Libya. The racket has been running for at least 15 years.
It is a dense and highly complex web and its partial unravelling has undoubtedly been due to painstaking undercover work by the CIA and MI6 as well as European intelligence agencies and IAEA investigators.
The unanswered questions are how much was known and when; and why has it taken so long to act.
In his speech on Wednesday President Bush claimed credit, along with Britain, for an intelligence triumph in cracking the Khan racket. "We've uncovered their secrets. This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals," he trumpeted, going into surprising detail.
"This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services gradually uncovered this network's reach, and identified its key experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A Q Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around the world, they recorded their conversations, they penetrated their operations."
His claim echoed a declaration last week by the CIA chief, George Tenet. But Washington's version of events failed to impress observers yesterday. "It's absurd," commented William Potter, a leading US expert in nuclear proliferation. "It's nonsense," said a senior source familiar with the IAEA investigation into the network.
David Kay, the official commissioned by Mr Bush to locate Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, told a Senate committee a fortnight ago that Iran had been pursuing a secret nuclear enrichment programme for 18 years, unknown to western intelligence, and that Libya was now known to have been far more advanced in its clandestine nuclear effort than suspected by the spies.
"We didn't discover it," he said. "There's a long record here of being wrong."
Critics suspect that the White House is claiming a intelligence victory to counter the alleged intelligence debacles and politicisation of the information in Iraq.
Two recent developments brought matters to a head in the case of Mr Khan.
First, Libyan information to MI6 and the CIA on the middlemen, the companies, and the Pakistani sources of the uranium enrichment equipment and nuclear bomb blueprint it bought. Second, a lengthy dossier on the Iranian nuclear effort supplied to the IAEA by Tehran at the end of October, which named at least five businessmen in Europe and the Middle East as being involved in the black market.
Armed with such specific information, the Americans were able to demand action by the Pakistani authorities against Khan and the IAEA investigators were able to trace the network.
US pressure brought the results in Islamabad leading to Mr Khan's confession: the Americans gave President Pervez Musharraf an ultimatum similar to the choice it gave him after the September 11 attacks. Then it was: "Help us get Osama bin Laden or face the consequences." This time it was was stop Mr Khan's activities or lose US backing.
Despite the suspicion that the White House and the CIA are seeking to make political capital of it, there are many experts and diplomats who credit western intelligence with exposing the Khan network.
"The US had very extensive intelligence on Khan, highly convincing, compelling and detailed," a diplomat who has been tracking events and has seen much of the intelligence said.
"They have known about Khan for a long time. But a political decision was taken to act now. You couldn't describe this as an intelligence failure."
He and others say the breakthrough came from the material supplied by Libya.
IAEA sources argue that they are not being credited with uncovering the incriminating evidence they obtained from Iran. They also suspect that "Bush's boosterism" is premature, and that the networks may be much more extensive than so far revealed.
Jon Wolfsthal, a former US government official and nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, agreed that US intelligence on Mr Khan was the key factor.
"That's not a recent development. The question was whether and when to act on it. But you can't see this as an intelligence failure."
David Albright, a leading US analyst of the US nuclear intelligence operation, said: "They missed this stuff for a very long time. It was operating under their nose. There's a lot more going on. They [the White House] have given us something to quiet us down. The IAEA is right to feel wronged."
beneficiary – a person or group who receives money, advantages, etc. as a result of something else
binding – wiążący
blueprint – projekt
breakthrough – przełom
bring sth to a head – reach a point when something has to be done about it
To Boast – chwalić się
clandestine – tajny
to commission – mianować
compelling – nie do odparcia
contentious – sporny, kontrowersyjny
Credit – uznanie
To Curb – ograniczać
debacle – klęska, fiasko
dense – gęsty
fortnight – dwa tygodnie
incriminating – obciążający
middleman – pośrednik
nuclear proliferation – rozprzestrzenianie technologii nuklearnej
Operative – tajny agent
painstaking – staranny, skrupulatny
pieced together – zebrany
Prospect – perspektywa
to pursue – realizować
racket – ciemne interesy, szwindel
To Shadow – śledzić
To shore up – podpierać ,wspierać
to trumpet – obwieszczać
undercover work – praca w ukryciu, tajna
to unravel – rozwijać, rozplątywać
to wrong sb – wyrządzać krzywdę
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